required to appoint a Compliance Officer for Legal Practice (COLP) 10 who must take reasonable steps to ensure that their firms comply with regulatory obligations. 11 The SRA has described COLPs as playing a key role in its scheme of OFR and as 'instrumental in creating a culture of compliance throughout a firm, becoming its focal point for the identification of risk, and the key point of contact for the SRA'.
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Yet despite their importance to this form of legal regulation, little is known about how compliance roles operate within legal service firms. This article addresses this gap through a a series of 24 semi-structured qualitative interviews with COLPs 13 that explored COLPs' views of their roles, their attitudes to regulation, and in particular to OFR, and to achieving compliance.
More specifically this study explores the interaction between two regulatory techniques, that is, between COLPs and OFR. Our analysis shows that COLPs are influential in constructing the meaning of OFR for their firms, and that their influence, and willingness to exert it, is reinforced by the regulatory framework. Less positively, the ambiguity of OFR was exploited by some COLPs to read down professional obligations and regulatory goals in order to pursue commercial objectives. Nevertheless
COLPs play a critical role in promoting and supporting professional values in the face of commercial pressures in both ABS and non-ABS firms.
The article is structured as follows. Section II provides an overview of the study's methodology. Section III describes how the COLP role developed and its link with entity regulation. The next sections explore how COLPs function as a regulatory mechanism. Thus Section IV examines COLPs' role as communicators of regulatory norms, and the strategies they adopt to promote compliance within their firms. Section V identifies the factors which enable COLPs to promote regulatory compliance in line with their interpretations of OFR. SectionVI explores concerns that the ethical judgment of individual lawyers is, inadvertently, being eroded by the introduction of the COLP role. We argue that, on the contrary, COLPs can encourage individual practitioners to take greater responsibility on matters of ethics. In our concluding section, we highlight the wider implications of our findings for national and international policy makers.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN
Our primary research method comprised two periods of semi-structured qualitative interviews undertaken with COLPs between September to December 2013, and January to March 2014. Interviews ranged from 45 minutes to an hour and a half.
All interviews were digitally recorded and analysed using NVivo 10.
In phase one, our sampling frame comprised the online register of ABSs maintained by the SRA, 14 which identifies the firm's COLP, as we wished to explore whether these COLPs were experiencing particular challenges in promoting compliance in non-traditional legal practices. Adopting a purposive sampling approach 15 , we identified a subset of firms of interest (90) from the total ABS population, which at that time (August 2013) totalled 169 entities. Our selection criteria combined two purposive sampling techniques: heterogeneous sampling 16 to reflect the diversity of ABS firms, and critical case sampling 17 to include firms where, due to their characteristics, one may expect COLPs to be experiencing challenges in enacting their 14 SRA 'Search for a licensed body (ABS)' at http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/firm-basedauthorisation/abs/abs-search.page 15 J, Ritchie., J Lewis, and G. Elam, 'Designing and Selecting Samples' in Qualitative Research Practice role. These included ABS firms that are subsidiaries of, or part owned by, a quoted company; high-profile new entrants to the legal sector including leading brands from other jurisdictions; firms receiving considerable media attention for their innovations.
We excluded ABSs in which the COLP was the managing partner. We wrote to all 90 ABS firms and followed up the initial letters with a phone-call and secured 13
interviews.
In phase two, aiming for a mix of practice size, practice area, geographical location and the COLP's position in the firm, we identified 30 firms, including firms that represented key archetypes such as the high street firm, the City firm, and the criminal practice. We contacted them by phone and secured eight interviews. Two interviews were secured by following up contacts suggested by the authors' personal networks. Another was a contact suggested by a respondent. The COLP sample comprised fifteen males and nine females. Fourteen were equity partners, four non-equity partners and two were sole practitioners. As well as occupying senior positions before their appointment, the majority (18) had entered the profession over fifteen years ago. Fourteen COLPs had a fee-earning role; two-fifths did not. In three firms lawyers were out-numbered by non-lawyers.
Our sample was small, but the 'confirmability' and 'credibility' of research findings 18 occurred in two ways. First, we presented to, and discussed our findings with,
COLPs at a number of COLP forums in 2016-2017. We received feedback that many of our findings reflected the COLP experience. Second we compared our research findings with similar studies 19 on non-lawyer compliance roles, in-house lawyers and US law firm General Counsel (GCs). COLPs share various similarities with these groups but they are also a unique composite. Like a number of non-lawyer compliance personnel, but unlike GCs and in-house lawyers, they have a mandatory compliance role; like GCs and in-house counsel, but unlike other compliance personnel, they are licensed lawyers subject to professional discipline; like GCs, they primarily deal with other lawyers similarly subject to professional discipline, but a minority are more akin to in-house lawyers in that they are engaged in promoting compliance to non-lawyers.
We found that many of our findings are consistent with the literature on compliance personnel, GCs and in-house lawyers, and we link this to similarities between COLPs and these groups. However we also found differences that we attribute to the uniqueness of the COLP role.
Thus studies of non-lawyer compliance personnel supported our findings on the importance of the COLP role being mandated by regulation, and on the factors that support the COLP role. However the studies also highlighted differences that we attribute to the fact that COLPs are lawyers subject to professional discipline. The GC and in-house counsel literature enabled further exploration of the relevance of a lawyer identity and the relevance of context. As explored in Section VIII a number of our findings on the COLP experience was reflected in the GC literature, which we argue is because GCs and most COLPs promote compliance with professional regulation to fellow lawyers with shared professional norms who are subject, on both sides of the Atlantic, to similar market conditions. This is reinforced by our findings in Section V 18 id. on COLPs in non-lawyer dominated firms who had more challenging experiences of communicating regulatory requirements. However the literature also flagged up an important difference between how COLPs approach compliance and enforcement and that adopted by GCs and in-house lawyers: as we discuss, COLPs are more robust, and we attribute this to the mandatory nature of the role.
When interpreting study findings, caution must be exercised due to sample size, developments since we gathered the data, and social desirability bias that is, the tendency to deny socially undesirable traits, 20 which we sought to mitigate by assuring anonymity. 21 However whilst we highlight the study's limitations in our discussion, nevertheless, the interviews enabled us to elicit information about problems that interviewees themselves did not see and observe the rationalizations interviewees adopted to justify the approaches they took.
III. THE COLP AND ENTITY REGULATION
When the Clementi Report, which laid out the framework for the current regulatory structure in England and Wales, advocated the introduction of Legal Disciplinary Practices (LDPs) it recognised that regulating only individuals would result in different lawyers in the same firm being subject to different regulatory regimes. 22 It therefore recommended firm-based regulation and a designated compliance role termed a 'Head of Legal Practice' (HOLP) 'with overall responsibility for the conduct of the legal business'.
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Clementi did not advocate ABSs, but they were nevertheless introduced by the Generally, however, the ABS COLPs reported that their role was no different to what they conceived it might be in non-ABS firms. Primarily this is because many ABSs were law firm conversions with minimal or no non-lawyer involvement.
However two COLPs did experience challenges that differed from those presented in traditional law firms. These were operating in firms at either end of the scale in size but in both, lawyer-managers (including, or solely, the COLP) out-numbered non-lawyers.
COLPs in both firms needed to explain that conduct that was legitimate in the unregulated sector was prohibited now that the business was regulated by the SRA. In the small firm the COLP had to educate non-lawyer managers -who had previously worked in unregulated markets -about regulatory compliance per se. She reported the ensuing tension and conflict:
I think it is probably harder for me coming into that commercial and non-lawyer environment than it would be for a COLP in an existing legal practice, where everyone is more attuned…here, the existing organisation was not a solicitors' practice, and so I have had to come in and try to impose those requirements on to others.' (COLP-6)
In the larger firm, it was not unfamiliarity with working in a regulated industry that created challenges for the COLP, but rather that the non-lawyers had difficulties with the regulatory norms of the legal profession:
If they were all lawyers, it would be easier, but they're not. This highlights a difference in ethos between lawyers and non-lawyers, an issue that was also raised in the smaller firm. Nevertheless the COLPs reported that when necessary they took a hard line on enforcement issues and were successful in protecting professional values. As such, they performed precisely the regulatory function that had been planned for them. Their experience though raises the possibility that firms dominated by non-lawyer managers pose a higher regulatory risk than solicitordominated firms, and that the COLP role is important in ensuring that regulatory objectives are adhered to in these firms. were not equity partners, 49 OFR's lack of clarity made it easier for their decisions to be challenged and harder for them to insist on compliance. In contrast, in two other firms, partner COLPs reported that the ambiguity encouraged others in the firm to defer to their professional judgment, increasing their power: OFR thus supported and underpinned their authority. 50 The next section explores further how COLPs exercised their authority to achieve compliance when they encountered challenges, and the role played by OFR.
V. NAVIGATING TENSIONS BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND REGULATORY OBJECTIVES AND LEVERAGING COMPLIANCE
In the highly competitive environment in which law firms operate, tensions exist between running a business commercially and adhering to the Code of Conduct. When
COLPs offer an interpretation of regulatory norms that is contrary to the interests of a fee-earner or the firm, it was not uncommon for them to encounter resistance. This section examines how they sought to overcome this and achieve compliance using 48 See also SRA's reform of continuing professional development that requires solicitors to reflect on and identify their learning and development needs: SRA Continuing Competence http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/cpd/tool-kit/continuing-competence-toolkit.page 49 In one of these the COLP was an associate, in another, a lawyer to whom the COLP had delegated the compliance role. 50 See also Bamberger and Mulligan, op. cit., n. 37, 490-491.
strategies similar to those identified by Parker in a study of non-lawyer compliance personnel.
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Depending on the context, compliance officers in Parker's study adopted one of two mutually reinforcing approaches to managing tensions between regulatory and business objectives. The first sought to harmonise the two sets of objectives by either articulating a business case for compliance or by finding 'a solution,' that is, a means of achieving business objectives that remained compliant with regulatory goals. 52 This approach does not necessarily entail promoting business objectives to the detriment of regulatory norms, though this is a risk. 53 However as Parker argues, a commitment to professional norms must be combined with a sensitivity to the commercial requirements of the organisation in order for compliance efforts to be successful.
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There was evidence of COLPs adopting the harmonizing strategy in which they acknowledged the conflict between commercial and regulatory goals and acted as problem-solving consultants to reconcile the differences. Notably, as COLP-10 explained, this was facilitated by the flexibility of OFR:
OFR's all about outcomes-focussed and risk-based approach, so I'm not just sat there saying (bangs desk), 'No, you have to do this.' It's, 'Let's look at what we need to do, let's look at what's right to do, what's best practice, and let's find a solution that works.
Others talked about balancing commercial objectives with compliance objectives, and of taking account of economic as well as professional considerations when 51 Parker op.cit., n. 9, 180. There were also parallels between the COLP approaches and the 'cops' and emphasise suasion and relationship building to obtain compliance. 58 We explore in the next section why this might be so.
Although there was little difference in approach between COLPs in ABS and non-ABS firms, in the two ABSs where the COLPs had encountered difficulties with nonlawyer managers, the COLPs' approach had evolved over time: they began with the enforcement strategy and later moved to a harmonisation one. COLP-7 remarked:
'at the beginning, it was either black or white with my own view on something; This occurred following intensive high-level executive coaching which he sought specifically in order to help him 'cope' with the conflicts he encountered with the nonlawyer board members. Likewise, the second COLP (COLP-6) reported that she had become more sympathetic to the commercial aspirations of the non-lawyer managers and would seek a regulatory compliant solution that met these aspirations; in turn the non-lawyers had become more attuned to the SRA's requirements. She described how 'there has been a movement to them becoming more solicitor-like in their outlook on things and me becoming more commercial' (COLP-6).
While this could indicate a weakening of the COLPs' willingness to challenge actions that prioritised commercial consideration, what they described is in line with the problem-solving approach adopted in other firms. None of the COLPs reported making a 'business case' for compliance, and nor were they aware of underplaying conflict. This could be due to social desirability bias or because compliance is viewed as simply the right thing to do. In support of the latter view, in a number of more innovative ABSs, there was evidence of COLPs prioritising professional over commercial values, by proposing 'solutions' that were more costly for their firms than the original non-compliant proposals, or by insisting on courses of action that firms had been seeking to avoid because they were contrary to the firms' commercial interests. Thus COLP-13 reported 'issues' with a partner over the closure of a department but nevertheless insisted 'We're not doing it, [that way].' As a result the course the firm adopted was 'a hell of a lot more expensive and time-consuming, but we have to do it [to be compliant]'.
In another firm there was disagreement over providing prospective clients with information about reforms to fee arrangements and giving clients the choice to determine which fee regime they wished to adopt: one was more favourable to clients, another to the firm. The lawyers did not wish to provide a choice in case clients opted for their claim to be processed under the former regime, resulting in the firm making less 'profit'. This led to a confrontation between the COLP and the lawyers, with the COLP prevailing:
But we had this tension with the Jackson reforms 59 in that, well, what do we tell our clients? …So in the end, though, they all succumbed to my will [laughter] and we sent letters to all of our clients and we explained it to them when they The clashes between commercial and regulatory goals also occurred at a strategic level in ABSs, perhaps reflecting a tendency to take a more innovative approach to developing the business and therefore one that tested regulatory boundaries. For instance, in one firm, the board wished to acquire a new business and exclude it from SRA regulation. The COLP reported that this would be non-compliant and insisted that the firm should either be incorporated into the business and subject to regulation or not acquired. A decision was made not to acquire the business.
In sum overall our data was positive from a regulatory standpoint, indicating that the COLPs wielded significant authority, and were prepared to exercise it, in order to require compliance with their interpretation of regulatory norms.
VI. FACTORS SUPPORTING THE COLPS' AUTHORITY
The previous sections suggest that the ambiguity of OFR reinforces COLPs authority, but also allows COLPs to find solutions that avoid the need to assert that authority. This in turn preserves their political capital which protects that authority from being eroded. However, OFR's ambiguity also made it easier to challenge more junior compliance personnel. This indicates that other factors also underpin the COLPs' authority. Studies in other contexts indicate that these include position and power within the firm structure, access to, and support by, senior management, and external regulatory support.
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The COLPs' responses suggested that this held true for them.
THE POSITION OF COLPS IN THE FIRM HIERARCHY
Regulatory literature suggests that compliance personnel will be most effective when they are senior employees. 61 While the SRA does not require COLPs to be partners they are required to be senior enough to have sufficient responsibility to discharge the role.
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The consensus amongst respondents in this study was that the COLP role should be performed by actors occupying a senior position within the firm. There were three reasons for this. Firstly respondents often demarcated themselves from firms that they On 'clout' see n. 55 above.
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Interestingly 'gravitas' is also important for US one instance challenges to a non-partner came from the Managing Partner and other equity partners. On the other hand, COLP-10 indicated that despite not being an equity partner she was successful in promoting compliance across the firm. COLP-16
suggested that there was a balance to be struck:
'between having someone who's got -who knows enough about what's happening, and who's got enough clout to do something about it if something
needs to be done. But also maintaining I think, a degree of separation from the direct management of the firm.'
These concerns are consistent with Chambliss' work which suggest that GCs who were long term partners may have had their independence compromised, but they had special authority to insist on compliance.
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The findings from this study are also backed by research that suggests that when people identify with a group and its values, their sense of self is linked to acting in compliance with the group's norms, 67 so when a conflict arises between the group's norms and COLPs also reported being prepared to leave the firm before they were knowingly party to a regulatory breach, but they were more ambivalent about whether they would also report the matter to the SRA in such circumstances.
Against this overall picture, detailed analysis reveals several nuances. In later interviews there were fewer references to 'heads being on the line', and no reference to fears of losing the ability to practice. It is likely that these fears lost salience as the role embedded. This is concerning because actual reporting levels were low, which does not support COLP claims that they were prepared to take a robust approach to reporting.
Out of the 24 COLPs interviewed, only seven said that they had reported regulatory breaches, 16 had not, and one refused to answer. Larger firms were more likely to report than smaller. Furthermore even though COLPs' formal authority to challenge partners with power does not depend on management support, COLPs did seek, and obtain, management support to pressurise recalcitrant lawyers, and subsequently negotiated with management regarding reporting material breaches. COLPs had not faced situations in which they had not been supported by management and their reporting obligations had brought them into conflict with the firm. How COLPs would respond in this situation, and whether concerns over personal exposure to professional discipline would lead them to insist on compliance as they claimed-particularly if those concerns have diminished over time-was unresolved.
COLPs also commonly referred to conflicts over regulatory obligations as arising with individual partners, demonstrating a tendency to frame non-compliance in terms of individual rather than entity breaches. In a similar vein, COLPs who described being under-resourced did not acknowledge that this could constitute a material breach of the firm's obligations. This is consistent with other literature which suggests that it is easier for compliance personnel to overlook systemic problems and focus on individual misconduct. 77 Thus Kirkland found GCs denied the relevance of institutional incentives that could lead to wrongdoing, preferring to see wrongdoing as purely a matter of individual failings. 78 Similarly Moorhead and Hinchly found that in-house and external lawyers focused on individual character rather than systemic risks to ethical conduct. 79 Problematically as this can be an unconscious process, fear of regulatory accountability would not address the problem. compliance personnel bring to their role.
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The majority of COLPs interviewed had undertaken their role willingly, with one describing it as a 'privilege'. Nearly all had already been performing a compliance function in their firm and were comfortable in taking up the formal COLP position, viewing it as a natural extension of their existing role. Previous experience relating to practice management, managing risk, or handling complaints and professional negligence claims, or being the money laundering officer were the most common routes to being appointed the COLP.
COLPs' willingness to carry out their role suggests a normative commitment to compliance. However research in other contexts has demonstrated that even when 82 Edelman, op. cit., n. 9, 1544; Edelman and Suchman, op. cit., n. 37, 499. compliance professionals express a positive commitment to regulatory goals, they can still translate those goals into business discourse and undermine their effect, particularly when these conflict with business objectives. 85 OFR is designed to impede cosmetic and creative compliance of this nature, and to deter the kind of game-playing and tickbox approach that often results from a rules-based regime, and which could enable the pursuit of commercial objectives at the cost of regulatory goals. 86 Nevertheless as Gilad found in the financial services sector, open-textured norms can also be 'read down' to comply with business goals, particularly when, as with OFR, it is left to firms to determine whether their internal practices and systems meet regulatory outcomes. 87 Empirical work indicates that both external and in-house lawyers 'read down' regulatory obligations. 88 Moreover Parker et al found that lawyers can influence clients to adopt a game-playing approach to the law, characterised by resistance to the objectives of regulation. However lawyers are also influenced by their clients' attitudes to the law: 89 thus when clients were committed to obeying the law, lawyers reinforced that commitment. 90 Meanwhile other research Parker et al conducted did not find that lawyers' professional identity materially differentiated lawyers from non-lawyers in their approach to compliance roles. 91 Conversely, Chambliss and Wilkins found that GCs, like COLPs, expressed a strong normative commitment to the goals of professional regulation, which, they suggested, might reduce the tendency to subvert professional regulatory goals in favour of business objectives. 92 Parker et al's adverse findings could result from the fact that lawyers typically do not feel accountable for what they do on their clients' behalf and believe that they should remain neutral vis a vis the clients' goals and methods (provided clients stay within the bounds of the law). 93 It is notable that whilst similar views as to neutrality and non-accountability have been expressed by in-house lawyers, it appears that they do seek to influence their clients' decisions, 94 and can be prepared to say no to their organizations. 95 One reason may be that, unlike external lawyers, they are closer to the consequences should things should turn out badly, and risk being held to account. 96 Given that COLPs have been assigned responsibility for taking reasonable steps to ensure that their firms comply with regulation, and a failure to do so could put their licence to practice at risk, they are even less able than in-house lawyers to hide behind the principle of non-accountability. This may explain why COLPs reported that they did not permit business objectives, or the firms' interests, always to take priority over 91 compliance objectives. It might therefore be expected that they would also avoid a game-playing approach to OFR.
Yet we found divergent approaches. On the one hand, COLP-12 thought that OFR reduced game-playing, asserting that:
… the thing about rules based regulation is that lawyers, almost by definition, The tendency to 'read down' obligations is also evidenced in the approaches some COLPs took to determining whether breaches were material, and so reportable, or not.
For example one COLP failed to report theft of client money through internet fraud on the basis that there was nothing wrong with the firm's processes and it had reimbursed the client immediately. Another only reported a breach after a client complained, rationalising that the complaint demonstrated that the impact on the client was such as to render the breach material.
The fact that COLPs displayed divergent approaches to interpreting OFR indicates that the problem does not necessarily lie with OFR itself: rather responses also depend on factors such as character and context. Whilst the sample size means it is not possible to say how common a game-playing approach is, it is striking that some of the COLPs interviewed admitted to this behavior, given that social desirability bias would be expected to inhibit such responses. 
VIII. THE COLP, OFR AND THE ETHICS OF INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS

IX. CONCLUSION
The bureaucratic nature of the modern law firm, the pressures its business practices create for the lawyers within it, and the increasing heterogeneity of its workforce, has created a need for entity regulation of legal service firms to safeguard professional standards. As more jurisdictions adopt entity regulation and permit nonlawyer participation in legal services firms, a compliance role is becoming an increasingly important regulatory mechanism in legal service firms. This article raises important questions about how such a role operates. A significant finding is the vital contribution of the regulatory structure in supporting and incentivising COLPs to promote compliance, combined with the COLPs' position as solicitors subject to professional discipline, factors which distinguish COLPs from other compliance groups. We therefore conclude that a mandatory compliance role is likely to be more effective in promoting the regulatory agenda and professional values within firms than leaving the development of such a role to the market or voluntary initiatives.
The study also demonstrates how one meta-regulatory technique, in this case OFR, can interact with another, the compliance role, to support or undermine compliance. Thus the majority of COLPs, including those in ABS entities, reported that their views on compliance were deferred to by partners and management, in part because of the ambiguity of OFR. This is significant given that the SRA proposes to not only retain OFR but also reduce detail in the Code of Conduct.
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However the study also highlighted concerns. The perceived ambiguity of OFR gave some COLPs a licence to push boundaries in order to pursue commercial objectives whilst others appeared to read down their obligations to avoid reporting breaches, something that they seemed entirely unaware of. In addition, despite bearing particular responsibility for promoting entity compliance, the COLPs seemed to frame and client interests that can arise in legal service firms. This mitigates, though does not eliminate, the commercial pressures that may affect their judgment, and may also give them authority to insist on compliant courses of action. 116 In any event research
suggests that in-house lawyers are also subject to ethical pressures, and may require support through ethical infrastructures. 117 As for concerns over whether personal accountability for ethics is being transferred to COLPs, our data shows that lawyers are turning to COLPs for advice in large numbers.
However the creation of the COLP role did not create the need for ethical advice within firms: this is a response to other factors including increased commercial pressures on lawyers. Proposals to ensure that solicitors receive training in OFR and professional conduct rules, whilst welcome, will not address these pressures. 118 In fact these are only likely to increase given that the SRA intends to change to its regulatory regime to places greater emphasis on the exercise of professional judgment. 119 However when COLPs are seen as solely or primarily responsible when things go wrong or if they are warned not to be 'business obstructers' by powerful partners, this does signify a problematic failure by partners to take personal responsibility for compliance. One solution might be to name other senior individuals-such as the Senior or Managing Partner-as personally accountable for ensuring that the COLP is supported and resourced, and as responsible for compliance, in addition to the COLP.
Emphasising that compliance is everyone's responsibility, as the SRA presently does, 120 is unlikely to address the problem because once responsibility becomes compliance to specific individuals can promote a broader appreciation of regulatory objectives within firms because, as this COLP put it: there was nobody focusing on it. Nobody whose role and absolute responsibility was to make sure that there was compliance across the firm. (COLP-10)
In sum we conclude that COLPs are a key regulatory mechanism in the context of entity regulation and OFR and have a critical role to play in protecting and promoting professional values in both ABS and non-ABS entities.
